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The Commonality of Causation
SERGIO J. CAMPOSt
This essay, a version of which was given as the inaugural Goldman
Endowed Lecture at Ohio Northern University School ofLaw, discusses the
treatment of causation in class actions, multidistrict litigation, and similar
collective litigation. Causation is a ubiquitous element of civil claims, and
typically it is treated as an individual element of a claim because it is
dependent on the circumstances of each individual claimant. Even if the
conduct at issue in litigation is "common, " or the same, for a group of
claimants, whether that conduct caused harm to a specific claimant will
depend on the unique circumstances of that claimant. For that reason, courts
have often refused to certify class actions, or have otherwise been reluctant
to utilize collective procedures, where issues of causation predominate the
proceedings. It is thought that in such cases plaintiffs are entitled to a more
tailored, individualized hearing to accurately assess causation consistent
with due process. This essay questions this common-sense notion that the
issue of causation is an "individual " issue and argues that causation is
actually much more "common" when one examines the causation element
and its proof in greater depth. The essay concludes by suggesting ways in
which the "commonality " ofcausation can be addressed in litigation to better
fulfill the deterrence and compensation objectives of the litigation.
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Email: scampos@Iaw.miami.edu. Phone: (617)
669-5397. This essay greatly benefited from the comments provided by those who attended the lecture.
It also benefited greatly from comments I received at a Miami workshop. I also want to thank David
Rosenberg and students in a class action class taught by Adam Moskowitz for their comments. Melanie
Ng, Daniel Settana, and Michael Tejada provided excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
I am honored to give the inaugural Goldman Endowed Lecture, a lecture
series created and funded by Robert Goldman that addresses issues
concerning class actions and prosecutorial techniques in civil or criminal
matters.' Robert Goldman is a source of great pride for the Ohio Northern
University Pettit College of Law, and justifiably so given his illustrious
career. Not only did Mr. Goldman have an exemplary thirty-year career in
the FBI specializing in white collar crime, but shortly after his retirement
embarked on an equally exemplary career as a class and mass action claims
administrator.2 Mr. Goldman is thus one of the very few lawyers to
distinguish himself in both the criminal justice system and in complex civil
litigation, a truly rare and admirable achievement. I hope that the humble
thoughts expressed here honor the boldness of Mr. Goldman's career and his
contributions to the legal profession.
Unfortunately, my own career has not involved much work with the
criminal justice system, so my focus will be on complex litigation, which has
been the great preoccupation of both my early legal career and my academic
career. Accordingly, I will discuss a topic of great importance not only to
complex litigation, but to the law itself: weedkiller.
Let me explain. This talk will focus on causation, which is a legal
element typically found in every civil claim.3 To recover for an injury, one
must show, with some exceptions, that the defendant's unlawful conduct
1. Sergio Campos to Deliver Inaugural Goldman Lecture, OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY: NEWS
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.onu.edu/news/sergio-campos-deliver-inaugural-goldman-lecture.
2. Office of Advancement, Ohio Northern University, Introduction about Robert Goldman at the
inaugural Goldman Lecture (Oct. 17, 2019).
3. See infra Part I.A. (illustrating that causation is an element in a variety of civil claims).
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caused the injury.' A requirement to prove causation to recover is far from
controversial. However, causation-its legal treatment, its proof, and its
procedural implications-can cause headaches for judges in complex cases.
This is certainly true of recent litigation involving Roundup, a weedkiller
introduced by Monsanto in the early 1970s that is commonly used in home
gardening. Roundup, which is sold in spray bottles and can still be purchased
at home improvement stores, utilizes glyphosate, an herbicide, to kill weeds.
Recently tens of thousands of plaintiffs have filed lawsuits across the
country alleging that the glyphosate in Roundup caused each plaintiff to
contract Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma ("NHL"). 6 Those actions filed in federal
court have been consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(the "JPMDL") for pre-trial proceedings before U.S. District Court Judge
Vincent Chiarra in the Northern District of California. I will refer to this
consolidation as the "Roundup multidistrict litigation" or "Roundup MDL,"
and the transferee court as the "MDL court."
The MDL court then did something unique. The court allowed three
plaintiffs to proceed to trial as "bellwether trials," or trials designed to provide
information for the other actions within the Roundup MDL. 8 The court then
ordered "reverse bifurcation," which divided each of the trials into two
phases.' In the first phase, the trials were only permitted to address the issue
of causation.'o Only after completion of the first phase would the trial
proceed to a second phase to address all remaining issues."
The plaintiffs objected to "reverse bifurcation" in part because they had
accumulated evidence that Monsanto had improperly influenced federal
4. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,
34 TEx. INT'L L. J. 135, 146 (1999). In some special circumstances, such as claims involving securities
fraud or some consumer claims, causation is sometimes "presumed," with an opportunity for the defendant
to introduce evidence to rebut the presumption. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988)
(permitting a plaintiff to presume reliance in a securities fraud claim). There are also some unique and
rarely used tort doctrines, such as alternative liability and market share liability, which modify the
evidentiary requirements for causation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 1
will discuss these more unique doctrines later in the lecture.
5. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 3d 956, 960; Roundup, The Story of the
Roundup Brand, ROUNDUP: LEARNING THE BASICS, https://www.roundup.com/en-us/library/learning-
basics/story-roundup-brand (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
6. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 960.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ("When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings."); In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.Supp.3d at 1348 (transfer
order transferring 19 civil action(s) to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
8. Pretrial Order No. 61 RE: Bifurcation, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741 (N.D.
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agencies with respect to the agencies' classification of glyphosate as a
carcinogen.12 While that evidence would support each plaintiff s claim that
Monsanto violated a duty to warn of the dangers of using Roundup, it would
not be relevant for purposes of proving or disproving causation,13 and the
MDL court repeatedly prohibited the plaintiffs from introducing such
evidence during the first phase.14
The decision to "reverse bifurcate" is unique because typically when a
court bifurcates trial proceedings, the first phase usually addresses issues that
are common, or the same, for each plaintiff in the class or MDL.15 Proceeding
in the normal, nonreverse way allows a court to efficiently determine a
common issue in one or a few proceedings for every plaintiff. Moreover, if
the plaintiffs cannot prevail on a common issue, then a court can avoid a
second phase altogether.'6
The issue of "causation," however, is not common to the plaintiffs in the
Roundup MDL. Whether exposure to the glyphosate in Roundup caused a
particular plaintiff s NHL will depend on facts that will differ from plaintiff
to plaintiff-the amount of Roundup each used, their medical and family
history, their age, and their exposure to other known causes of NHL. 1 7 In its
"reverse bifurcation" order, which was only two pages long, the MDL court
noted that resolution of the causation issue in the initial phase can be efficient
if it can be shown that no plaintiff can possibly prevail." If at least one of
the plaintiffs can prevail, then it would introduce a useful data point for the
remaining plaintiffs in the Roundup MDL.1 9 However, it is unclear how
useful that data point can be, particularly if the circumstances of the
bellwether plaintiff turn out to be not particularly typical of the remaining
plaintiffs in the MDL.
12. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018) at 12.
13. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F.Supp.3d 1085, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing
failure-to-warn claims).
14. Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 8.
15. 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:3 (5th ed. 2019) ("Courts
sometimes use the phrase "reverse bifurcation" as well-this is a reference to the fact that a common use
of bifurcation, described below, is to try liability issues to a jury before damages; in reverse bifurcation,
damages are tried before liability."); Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213 (2006)
("Reverse bifurcation is a trial procedure in which the jury determines damages first, before determining
liability.").
16. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 11:4 ("A bifurcated trial may be more efficient where the trial
of the first issue obviates the need for the trial of the second").
17. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 960 (discussing the unique circumstances
- such as exposure level to glyphosate and medical history - of each individual plaintiff); see also Angelo
v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 965 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The evidence therefore concentrates on
the plaintiff's health history, the extent of his exposure . .. the possible causes of his illness, and the
losses be has suffered from his illness.").
18. Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 8.
19. Id.
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In this lecture, I want to use the "reverse bifurcation" order in the
Roundup MDL as a springboard to examine "the commonality" of causation,
understood as the extent to which "causation" can be treated as a "common"
issue. As a matter of both existing law and common sense, it is hard to view
the issue of causation as the same for each plaintiff except in very limited
circumstances. Whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff s injury
will depend on the circumstances of that particular plaintiff.
However, and as I discuss in more detail below, causation is somewhat
unique as an individual issue because proving it requires information about
other plaintiffs and uninjured persons.2 0 Thus, while the causation issue may
differ from plaintiff to plaintiff, the process of proving causation often
requires constructing counterfactuals that will depend on an assessment of
individuals who may not be, and may never be, plaintiffs.2 1 More
importantly, this counterfactual evidence is the same for each plaintiff. Thus
much, if not all, of what is needed to prove causation in any individual case
is indeed common to the class.22
Perhaps more controversially, I want to challenge the necessity of
proving causation on an individual basis. In cases like the Roundup MDL,
which concern the allegedly unlawful mass production conduct of the
defendant, the objective of the litigation is not only to compensate the injured
individuals but to enforce the law. However, the enforcement objective of
civil litigation in cases involving personal injuries often gets lost because of
the timing of the court's intervention. The court, even the MDL court, only
steps in after the alleged unlawful conduct has occurred. Accordingly, courts
only begin to operate when prevention of the specific tort at issue is
impossible.
Nevertheless, the procedures and practices by which any court uses to
assess liability will necessarily have an impact on a potential defendant's
conduct. Put another way, the very procedures used by the MDL court will
affect the choices and decisions potential defendants make with respect to
their conduct. On an intuitive level this hopefully rings true, as evidenced by
'4the fact that the presence or absence of a police car nearby usually has some
impact on whether one drives the speed limit. Similarly, the prospect of
litigation and liability will (and should) induce defendants to choose conduct
that avoids those costs, or at least minimize them as much as possible.
Accordingly, there is no time like the present for a court to consider how its
treatment of issues like causation will affect potential defendants, especially
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part II.C.
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when choices made by the court ex post can lead to more or less legal
violations, and the harms they cause, ex ante.
This lecture will conclude by taking seriously the law enforcement
impact of a court's treatment of causation.2 3 I want to suggest that, for law
enforcement purposes, the only relevant inquiry is whether the defendant's
conduct caused the population harm-whether the alleged conduct caused an
increase in the incidence of a harm like Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma among
the exposed class of individuals (plaintiffs and unharmed persons) as a
whole.2 4 Focusing on this population causation inquiry, which is different
from the typical general causation inquiry, would align the court's inquiry
with the decision-making of the defendant at the time of the alleged legal
violation. At that point, when the defendant is choosing among different
actions, it only acts, and only can know that it acts, against a population.25
Indeed, the very definition of a mass tort involves conduct that is common to
a large class of individuals because it is conduct directed to that class in an
undifferentiated way.2 6
I will conclude by arguing that a focus on population-based causation, as
opposed to specific causation, provides potential defendants the correct
incentives regarding their conduct.27 Moreover, it would prevent potential
defendants from using the difficulty of proving specific causation to avoid
some or all of its liability. Finally, doing away with specific causation, or at
least a strong version of it, would free the court to address more ffectively
the compensation concerns of those who are actually injured.
I. LIABILITY, CAUSATION, AND DAMAGES
To understand the uniqueness of the MDL court's "reverse bifurcation"
order, I want to begin by discussing the basic elements of the type of civil
claims that class actions, MDLs, and similar collective procedures are
designed to address, including the failure-to-warn claims at issue in the
Roundup MDL. 2 8 In doing so, I want to demonstrate the issues of fact that
arise for each of the elements of these claims, and further show that the
"commonality" or "individuality" of an element depends on when the facts
necessary to prove that element occurred.
23. See infra Part II.D.
24. See infra Part II.D.
25. See infra Part II.D.
26. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A
Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993) (noting that "the commonality of issues and
actors among individual mass tort claims" distinguishes mass torts from other "high-volume litigation").
27. See infra Part II.D.
28. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F.Supp.3d at 1086-87 (discussing failure-to-warn
claims).
[Vol. 46234
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A. The Basic Elements of a Claim
Consider, for example, the basic elements of the failure-to-warn claim in
the Roundup MDL. 2 9 Here, I will focus on the California state-law claim
asserted by Edward Hardeman, whose action is being tried as one of the three
bellwether trials in the Roundup MDL.30 Under California law, a plaintiff
must prove the following elements of a failure-to-warn claim:
(1) "the manufacturer's actual or constructive
knowledge of the risk" of a harm or hazard31 (duty);
(2) A failure to warn "consumers about hazards of
which they are unaware, so that they can avoid the
product or minimize its danger by careful use"32
(breach);
(3) The failure-to-warn caused the harm insofar as it
was "a substantial factor in bringing about the
injury" 33 (causation);
(4) The failure-to-warn resulted in damageS34
(damages).
These four elements-(l) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and
(4) damages-are typical elements of all civil claims. The elements can be,
and often are, grouped together in a single element. In addition, the elements
can also be broken apart into separate elements to focus on important
subsidiary facts.
Consider some other examples. For example, to prevail on an antitrust
claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,35 a plaintiff must show:
2 9. Id.
30. Pretrial Order No. 56: Bellwether Trial Selection, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2741 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018).
31. Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc., 63 Cal. 4th 167, 181 (2016).
32. Id. A manufacturer may be held "strictly liable for a failure to warn if a warning was feasible
and the absence of a warning caused the plaintiffs injury." Id. "Conversely, to prevail on a claim for
negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller's conduct fell below the standard of care."
Id. (citing Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1002-03 (1991).
33. Novak v. Cont'l Tire N. Am., 22 Cal. App. 5th 189, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that
"California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for
cause-in-fact determinations") (quoting Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 968-69
(1997)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent conduct is a
legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm . . . ").
34. See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1320
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("[No cause of action accrues in a tort action until damage has occurred.") (citations
omitted).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2020).
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(1) a violation of the antitrust laws-here, § 1 of the
Sherman Act [liability],
(2) individual injury resulting from that violation
[causation], and
(3) measurable damages [damages].36
Here the "duty" and "breach" elements are grouped together as a single
element of "liability." Courts commonly group the "duty" and "breach"
elements as a single "liability" element, and for the purposes of clarity I will
do that here.
In contrast, consider federal securities fraud claims under Rule 1Ob-5,"
where a plaintiff must prove:
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant [liability 1];
(2) scienter [liability 2];
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security
[causation 1];
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission
[causation 2];
(5) economic loss [damages 1]; and
(6) loss causation [damages 2].3
Unlike a Section 1 antitrust claim, which lumps the "duty" and "breach"
elements together, the elements of the 1Ob-5 claims are subdivided.3 9
Nevertheless, they still correspond to the basic liability, causation, and
damages elements of the antitrust and failure-to-warn claims. The first and
second elements, misrepresentation and scienter, correspond to "liability."
36. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Importantly,
individual injury (also known as antitrust impact) is an element of the cause of action; to prevail on the
merits, every class member must prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the alleged violation.")
(citing Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,454 (3d Cir. 1977)).
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006
ed., Supp. V); Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 1Ob-5, 17 CFR § 240.1Ob-5 (2019).
38. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455,460-61 (2013) (quoting Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)).
39. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b);
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.l0b-5.
[Vol. 46236
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The third and fourth elements, the "connection" and "reliance" elements,
correspond to "causation." Finally, the last two elements, "economic loss"
and "loss causation" correspond to "damages."4 0
Finally, consider the elements of a claim of employment discrimination
under Title VII.4' To assert a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class
[liability 1];
(2) [s]he was qualified for the position in question
[liability 2];
(3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action
[liability 3 & damages]; and
(4) the adverse action took place under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination
[causation].42
Here, the elements are somewhat jumbled, but they still correspond to the
liability, causation, and damages elements of typical civil law claims. The
first two elements represent liability elements insofar as they determine
whether a duty to not discriminate arises with respect to the plaintiff. The
third element is also a subsidiary element of liability insofar as the third
element defines the "breach" of that duty as an "adverse employment
decision." Moreover, the third element's focus on the "adverse"-ness of that
employment decision is at least one component of damage to the plaintiff.4 3
The fourth element, which addresses whether the adverse action was caused
40. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 563 U.S. 804, 812 (2011). Despite its name, "loss
causation" has less to do with causation than with the existence and magnitude of the damages. Id. The
"connection" and "reliance" elements correspond to what courts refer to as "transaction" causation, or
whether the transaction induced the purchase or sale of the security by the plaintiff. Id. "Loss causation,
by contrast, requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the market
price also caused a subsequent economic loss." Id. For example, a misrepresentation may inflate the value
of a stock but intervening causes may be the actual cause of a later decline in value, and thus the
misrepresentation may not have been responsible for any loss. Id. at 812-13. Thus, "loss causation" is
more akin to a requirement that, in order to recover, a violation cannot be harnless, so to speak. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 563 U.S. at 812.
41. E.g., Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 2010).
42. Id.
43. Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549,551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("In order to present a viable claim
of employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show he suffered an adverse employment
action," which requires a showing of "materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find objectively tangible harm.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
2020] 237
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by discrimination, clearly sounds in causation, as Title VII itself states that a
plaintiff must show that discrimination was "a motivating factor for any
employment practice.A4 In sum, Table 1 shows all four claims and how their
elements correspond to the basic elements of a civil claim.
TABLE 1 - ELEMENTS OF A CWLL CLAIM
Liability Causation Damages
California * "the manufacturer's The failure-to-wa The failure-to-
Failure-To- actual or caused the harm insofar warn resulted
Warn Claim constructive as it was "a substantial in damages
knowledge of the factor in bringing about
risk" of a harm or the injury"
hazard (duty);




so that they can




Antitrust a violation of the individual injury measurable
Section 1 Claim antitrust laws-here, § 1 resulting from that damages
of the Sherman Act violation
Securities Fraud * a material * a connection * economic
lOb-5 Claim misrepresentation or between the loss; and
omission by the misrepresentation or * loss
defendant; omission and the causation.
* scienter; purchase or sale of
a security;
* reliance upon the
misrepresentation or
omission;
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)
("Congress has since amended Title VII [in 1991] by explicitly authorizing discrimination claims in which
an improper consideration was 'a motivating factor' for an adverse employment decision.").
[Vol. 46238
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Employment * she is a member of the adverse action took she suffered
Discrimination a protected class; place under an adverse
Title VII Claim * she was qualified circumstances giving rise employment
for the position in to an inference of action
question; discrimination
* she suffered an
adverse employment
action
The three basic elements of a civil claim-liability, causation, and
damages-not only are typical of all civil claims, but they also typically occur
in chronological order.4 5 This point is often missed by civil procedure
scholars because litigation occurs after the elements of the claim, and scholars
understandably focus on the chronological phases of litigation rather than the
chronological order of the underlying material facts of the claim.
Consider, for example, Figure 1, which is a timeline I use to teach my
introductory civil procedure course to 1Ls. The timeline is meant to illustrate
the phases of litigation in federal district court, from the filing of the
complaint46 to the entry of judgment.4 7 For those who did not attend or are
not currently attending law school, the timeline uses Greek symbols that are
commonly used to refer to the parties in the litigation-specifically, 7[ denotes
the plaintiff and A denotes the defendant.48 Figure 1 also uses an arrow rather
than a "v." because it more precisely shows that the plaintiff is asserting a
claim against he defendant.
45. I have noted in previous writings that "the defendant's liability will depend on the resolution
of issues of law and fact related to [a] common decision," a decision "made by the defendant before the
[wrong] occurs." Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1068-69
(2012). Other scholars have noted the temporal distinction between the "defendant's conduct" and the
"plaintiff s eligibility" for relief. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REv.
1855, 1874-81 (2015) (discussing examples); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 805, 832 (1997) (distinguishing between the "upstream" issue of liability and the
"downstream" issue of damages); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice By Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 588 (1987) ("[I]n mass accident situations, the firm's
accident prevention measures are of necessity the product of a collective, undifferentiated assessment of
the probable loss from its activities for the class of potential victims as a whole; and, correspondingly,
care-taking usually cannot be adjusted on an individualized basis.").
46. FED. R. CIv. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . ..").
48. Maggy, Legal Aavnms & Aldeviaions Emy IL &dent Sud Krow, ADAPnBAR (Aug 26, 2019
https://blog.adaptibar.com/legal-acronyms-students-should-know/.
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Figure 1 - Phases of the Litigation
Pleading Discovery Trial
itA
Rule 3 Rule 8; 12 Rule 56 Rule 50





This timeline only focuses on dispositive motions and the three major phases
of litigation. Of course, one can add additional procedures or events to the
timeline to provide a more accurate picture of the litigation cycle. In my
teaching I tend to focus on these phases and their concomitant dispositive
motions because they provide a good "forest"-view of litigation while also
demonstrating that litigation could be short-circuited before the next phase if
dispositive motions are successful.49
But one major disadvantage of this particular timeline is that it only
focuses on litigation. It does not capture the features of the underlying
material facts necessary to support the liability, causation, and damage
elements of the claim. One needs to expand the timeline further back to
capture those underlying facts. Consider, for example, Figure 2, a revised
timeline that minimizes litigation events but shows the underlying facts that
comprise the basic elements of a civil claim.
Figure 2 - Litigation and the Elements of the Claim
liability: Causation: 12magn: Litigatimn
A Conduct i 7
Chooses Causes Suffers Sues
Conduct Injury Damage A
AK < xX _* 7t r-` L 7 A
not x
49. What to Expect - A Lawsuit Chronology, FINDLAW, https://litigation.findlaw.com/filing-a-
lawsuit/what-to-expect-a-lawsuit-chronology.html ( ast visited Mar. 13, 2020).
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Figure 2 minimizes the events of the litigation process and simply refers to
the litigation process as a whole as "Litigation." Moreover, Figure 2 pushes
the litigation process towards the right side to make room for the prior events
on the timeline.
By creating this room on the timeline, Figure 2 can now include the three
basic elements of a civil claim-liability, causation, and damages. It also
includes a brief description of the events that would prove each of these
elements. For example, under "liability," Figure 2 states "A chooses
conduct," as it is the defendant's conduct, specifically the choices the
defendant made or should have made with respect to that conduct, that will
determine whether the defendant had a duty and whether the defendant, in its
choice, breached that duty. Figure 2 here shows a choice between two
actions, which it denotes as "x" and "not x." Under "Causation," Figure 2
shows that the x action is chosen, and the issue then becomes whether the x
action caused the plaintiffs injury. Under "Damages," Figure 2 shows that
plaintiff suffered a loss which it denotes as "L." In general, proof of damages
will be determined by the existence and magnitude of the loss, "L."
Figure 2 demonstrates that the basic elements of a civil claim occur in a
sequence.50 The claim begins, so to speak, with the liability element, which
is the defendant's choice of conduct. It then concerns the causation element,
which is the impact of the defendant's choice on the plaintiff. Finally, it
concludes with the damage element, which is the extent, or amount, of any
damage caused by the impact of the defendant's conduct. As recognized by
courts, incurring damages is generally understood as "the last element
essential to a cause of action [to] occur[].""
B. Liability v. Damages
With this basic background in mind, I want to return to the issue of the
uniqueness of the Roundup MDL court's reverse bifurcation order by
discussing in more detail the "liability" and "damage" elements of the claim.
In particular, I want to discuss the specific kind of defendant conduct that
typically serves as the basis for the "liability" element in MDLs, class actions,
and similar collective procedures. I then want to contrast the defendant's
conduct, which forms the evidentiary basis of the "liability" element, with the
facts that form the evidentiary basis of the "damage" element.
50. See Campos, supra note 45; Burch, supra note 45.
51. See San Francisco Unified School Dist., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1326 ("In tort actions, the statute
of limitations commences when the last element essential to a cause of action occurs. The statute of
limitations does not begin to run and no cause of action accrues in a tort action until damage has occurred.")
(citations omitted).
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Class actions, MDLs, and similar collective procedures typically involve
claims concerning the mass production conduct of a defendant toward a large
class of individual claimants.2 The conduct can range from
(1) as in the Roundup litigation, the design, production,
sale, and marketing of a product (or class of
products) to a large number of consumers;53
(2) an action, or set of actions, that reduces the
competition in a market with many participants;4
(3) disclosing false statements regarding a security to
many participants in a securities market;5 5
(4) a firm's discrimination (or failure to prevent
discrimination) of its large number of employees on
the basis of gender;56 or
(5) a state child welfare agency's failure to protect the
welfare of the many children who require the
agency's services.57
The first four items on this list track the failure-to-warn, antitrust, securities
fraud, and employment discrimination claims I discussed earlier. I have also
added an additional item concerning the typical conduct at issue in civil rights
or impact litigation claims which are initiated to reform an existing
governmental agency.s5 This list is by no means exhaustive, and I am sure
one can think of other examples of similar mass production conduct.
I want to emphasize two things about this list. First, as demonstrated by
the examples above, "mass production" conduct can arise from both private
actors and public actors.5 9 I purposefully included examples of both,
including the impact litigation claims, to show that mass production conduct
is not unique to either the private or public sector. Second, mass production
52. Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States,
Presented Conference: Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, Geneva, Switzerland
at 5 (July 21-22, 2000).
53. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.Supp.3d at 1347.
54. E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
55. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 264 (2014).
56. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
57. M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 243 (5 tb Cir. 2018).
58. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979) (discussing
such litigation).
59. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.Supp.3d at 1347; see Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 27;
see Halliburton Co., 537 U.S. at 264; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342; see M.D. by Stukenberg,
907 F.3d at 243.
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conduct as defined here does not necessarily involve a single act.o It can
involve a "pattern or practice" or even an omission, or failure to act.'
However, the mass production conduct does involve a single choice, for
example, to engage in the pattern or practice, or a choice to ignore the
individual choices of others who the defendant had a duty to supervise.62
I emphasize "choice" because in class actions and MDLs like the
Roundup MDL the "liability" element of the claims all concern a choice the
defendant made with respect to its conduct. In essence, the plaintiffs claim
that this choice was not only unlawful, but also caused them harm. I
recognize that "choice" is a loaded term, and I do not want to suggest that
mass production conduct is limited to intentional or purposeful conduct.
Instead, I want to use the term "choice" in as broad a sense as possible, to
include intentional decisions as well as failures to decide, omissions, or
inconsiderate behavior.63 Even carelessness or thoughtlessness can be
understood as a choice-the choice to be careless or thoughtless, so to
speak.64
More importantly, I want to emphasize that this mass production choice
is common, or the same, for each of the claimants in the class action or
MDL. 5 Again, evidence of the mass production choice made by the
defendant will determine the defendant's liability and is thus the chief focus
of the "liability" element, because evidence of that choice will determine
whether the defendant violated or breached a legal duty owed to the
plaintiffs.66 However, because that choice was made for a "mass," that choice
is the same, and proof of that choice will be the same, for the individuals in
the "mass" harmed by that choice.67 Indeed, it is generally recognized that
what differentiates class action and MDL litigation from other high-volume
litigation like auto accident litigation is that litigation involving collective
procedures typically share a "commonality of issues and actors among
individual mass tort claims."68
60. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342.
61. Id.
62. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.Supp.3d at 1347; see also Comcast Corp., 569 U.S.
at 27; Halliburton Co., 537 U.S. at 264; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342.
63. See Choice, Merriam-Webster (defining "choice" as simply "the act of choosing."); see also
Choose, Merriam-Webster (defining "choose" as, among other things, "to make a selection" or "decide").
64. See Campos, supra note 45, at 1071 (noting that "[tihe firm's ex ante decision concerning its
precautionary measures could be subject to the consumer expectations test, to an industry custom, or to a
safety regulation under negligence per se rules").
65. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 26, at 966.
66. Campos, supra note 45, at 1068-72 (noting the commonality of the defendant's ex ante
decision); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintifs Don't, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 428-29 (2000) (same).
67. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 26, at 966.
68. Id. at 966.
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In contrast to the commonality of the "mass production" choice that is
the basis of the liability element in class actions and MDLs like Roundup, the
facts that underlie the "damage" element are far from common.69 Unlike the
defendant's "mass production" choice, the impact of that choice (assuming
that the choice caused an impact) will depend on specific facts about each
victim.70
The non-common, or individual, nature of the evidentiary facts
supporting damages can be concretely seen in the Roundup MDL itself.7 '
There the plaintiffs allege that exposure to the glyphosate in Roundup caused
them to contract Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.72 But the plaintiffs were not
the only users of Roundup, which can still be purchased in retail stores.7 3
While the plaintiff consumers suffered Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, other
consumers suffered no harm at all.74 Moreover, even the Non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma sufferers can, and do, vary with respect to the severity of the
disease, when the disease manifested itself, the hospital costs that resulted
from contracting the disease, the amount of lost wages, if any, and other
costs.75 This is because the ffects of the glyphosate (again, to the extent that
glyphosate can cause such effects) can vary with respect to individual facts
about the claimants and their use of the product-their amount of use and
exposure, the frequency of the exposure, and their personal and family history
with respect to Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, just to name a few.76
Like the commonality of the "liability" element, the variability of the
damage element among plaintiffs is a typical feature of "mass tort" cases like
the Roundup MDL which involve personal injury claims." Consider the
Supreme Court's discussion of the plaintiffs in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,7 8 a case involving claims arising from asbestos exposure: "[C]lass
members in this case were exposed to different asbestos-containing products,
in different ways, over different periods, and for different amounts of time;




73. Jade Scipioni, Big U.S. Retailers Stick by Roundup After Cancer Verdict, FoxBUSINESS (Aug.
17, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/big-us-retailers-stick-by-roundup-after-cancer-verdict.
74. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F.Supp.3d 1102, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
75. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.Supp.3d at 1347.
76. Pretrial Order No. 85: Denying Monsanto's Motion for Summary Judgment on Specific
Causation, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741 at 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2019).
77. Issacharoff, supra note 45, at 832 ("What distinguishes these is not that they sound in tort, but
rather the fact that the upstream inquiry is not dispositive. In cases such as asbestos, for example, even if
there is a common upstream inquiry into the fact that asbestos exposure causes asbestosis, there is an
immediate need to shift downstream and find fact after fact with regard to each individual plaintiff.").
78. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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some suffered no physical injury, others suffered disabling or deadly
diseases."79
The variability of the "damage" element among the plaintiffs is not
unique to "mass tort" cases like Roundup and asbestos claims.8 o In fact, in
all of the contexts I have discussed so far-antitrust, securities fraud,
employment discrimination, and even civil rights cases-the "damages"
suffered by each of the plaintiffs can and do vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.81
The "liability" and "damage" elements demonstrate that whether an
element is "common" or "individual" depends on the timing of the facts
necessary to prove that element.82 Specifically, the facts necessary to prove
the elements of liability all concern the defendant's ex ante decision-
making-what I have called its "choice"-towards the exposed population
prior to any actual injury.8 3 At that point in time, the defendant's ex ante
choice with respect to its conduct is the same for every member of that
population, and thus facts concerning that choice will be common to each of
the claimants within the population.84 In contrast, the facts necessary to prove
damages occur expost, or after the defendant has acted, are mainly concerned
with the effect of that behavior on each plaintiff.85 Here, the facts needed to
prove damages concern the specific circumstances of each individual
plaintiff.
Given the "common" nature of the liability element and the
"individualistic" nature of the damage element, a common method of
bifurcating litigation in class actions is to begin with (1) an initial "liability"
phase to determine whether the defendant's conduct violated the law, and
then, if liability is established, (2) a "damages" phase to determine the
damage amount for each individual." This common method of bifurcation is
demonstrated in Figure 3 below.
79. Id. at 609 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-28 (3d Cir. 1996)
(individual citations omitted)).
80. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:54.
81. See id
82. See Campos, supra note 45; Burch, supra note 45.
83. Campos, supra note 45, at 1068-72 (noting the commonality of the defendant's ex ante
decision); Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 428-29 (same)
84. Campos, supra note 45, at 1068-74.
85. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:54.
86. Id.
87. Id. at n.3 (citing cases); see also Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at n.6 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (stating, in case resolved on other grounds, that "at the outset, a class may be certified for
liability purposes only, leaving individual damages calculations to subsequent proceedings") (citing 2
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:54, n.3).
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Figure 3 - Bifurcation
Liability Damage
Phase Phase
This common form of bifurcation has the benefit of allowing the court to
decide common liability issues in a single proceeding for all plaintiffs or class
members.8 8 Moreover, if the plaintiffs fail in the liability phase, then the more
resource-intensive "damage" phase, which would entail individualized
hearings or trials with respect to each plaintiff on the damage issue, can be
avoided altogether.89 When designed in this way, bifurcation can economize
judicial resources and effectively resolve the plaintiffs' claims.90
C. Class Actions and MDLs
It is worth pointing out one quirk about the use of bifurcation. Bifurcation
is recognized as an effective procedure in class actions because it allows
courts to address liability issues in a single proceeding for all class members
prior to dealing with the more particularized issues of damages.91 However,
bifurcation procedures have not been commonly used in class actions
involving personal injury claims like the claims in the Roundup MDL. 92 ThiS
is because class actions involving such "mass tort" claims are rarely, if ever,
88. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, p 11:8 (noting that "[t]he efficiencies of the class suit can be
accomplished by trying the defendant's liability once in the aggregate proceeding while working out the
subsequent damages, if necessary, either through similar classwide proof or through some kind of more
individualized procedure").
89. 4 id. g 11:4 (noting that "trial bifurcation is widely accepted. for that reason); see also
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MVANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, 4th, § 33.23 (2004) ("Bifurcation is
appropriate where determination of one issue could wholly eliminate the need to try another complicated
or time consuming issue, where used to negate prejudice to a party. c a .")v
90. Burch, supra note 45 at 1893 ("Oftentimes in collective litigation, resolving a core question-
typically one that centers on the defendant's conduct-can have a domino effect on all the cases. When
that occurs, certifying the issue materially advances litigants' claims.").
91. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 11:8.
92. 2 id.
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certified as class actions in federal court.93 This is due to how courts have
interpreted and applied the federal class action rule, Rule 23, which, for
claims asserting damages, requires for class certification purposes a finding
that the common issues "predominate" over individual issues.94 Courts have
concluded that, in mass tort cases, the individual issues concerning damages
overwhelm the common issues of liability.95 Interestingly enough, courts
have further recognized that "[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain
cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust
laws," even though such cases involve the same individual damage issues as
mass tort cases.96 Accordingly, bifurcation procedures in class actions tend
to involve antitrust,9 7 consumer fraud,9 8 and employment discrimination
claims,99 but not mass tort claims.00
State courts, in contrast, have been more flexible with respect to mass tort
class actions and bifurcation. In the Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.'o tobacco
litigation, for example, the Florida Supreme Court approved a bifurcation
procedure whereby a class action trial was held on common liability issues,
with the class action then decertified.'02 The individual tobacco plaintiffs
could then file their own individual cases and use issue preclusion to establish
liability based on the court's liability findings in the class trial. 03
Because federal class actions are disfavored for mass tort claims like the
personal injury claims in the Roundup MDL, mass tort claims filed in federal
court are now typically processed using multidistrict litigation, as evidenced
by the Roundup MDL itself.10 Multidistrict litigation differs from class
actions in two respects. First, unlike class actions, MDLs permit each
93. Id (noting that "[t]his is generally the rule with regard to the significant personal injury
damages, and the predominance requirement therefore precludes certification in most mass tort personal
injury cases .... "); see also Campos, supra note 45, at 1063 (noting that "almost all courts and scholars
disfavor the use of class actions in mass tort litigation").
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
95. Issacharoff, supra note 45.
96. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
97. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2001),
overruled on other grounds byIn re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
98. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir.
2013).
99. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482,489 (7th Cir. 2012),
overruled on other grounds by Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018).
100. There has been some movement o allow more such bifurcation for tort claims. See, e.g., In re
Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 806-07, 816 (5th Cir. 2014).
101. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. S. Ct. 2006).
102. Id. at 1277.
103. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 428 (Fla. S. Ct. 2013).
104. See Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion
Era, 56 SAINT Louis U. L.J. 1203, 1206 (discussing these changes); see also Andrew D. Bradt & D.
Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV.
1259, 1261, n.4 (2017) (citing studies that show that 36 percent of all federal cases are MDLs).
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plaintiff to retain their own counsel, rather than have a single "class counsel"
for the entire class.'05 Second, MDLs are limited only to pretrial proceedings,
although courts can direct and guide individual trials.1 06 Thus, MDLs are
more akin to consolidations than to class actions insofar as they are a
collection of individual actions rather than one action.1 07 Indeed, class actions
can be, and often are, filed within an MDL.'08
Despite these differences, MDLs function very similarly to class actions.
First, MDL courts typically appoint attorneys, either as lead attorneys, as part
of a "plaintiffs committee," or both in order to do "common benefit work"
for the class.109 While, on the surface, the parties retain their own counsel,
the reality is that lead attorney and plaintiffs committees "do not exist simply
for attorney convenience; they assume control of the litigation and their duties
usurp the traditional attorney's daily responsibilities.""t0 Indeed, some judges
refer to MDLs as "quasi-class actions."' In the Roundup MDL, for example,
the court appointed a plaintiffs' executive committee with co-lead counsel to
engage in "common benefit work" for all of the plaintiffs in the MDL" 2 and
even set up a "common benefit fund" to compensate the work of that
committee."3
Second, despite being limited to pretrial proceedings, courts in MDLs can
engage in similar bifurcation procedures as in class actions.114 MDL courts
can do so by designating certain actions for "bellwether trials" to resolve
common issues of liability, with those findings guiding common issues for
the other actions in the MDL." 5 The Roundup MDL court, for example, is
105. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. III Lee, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775,777 (2010).
106. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 143, at 1263 (noting these two differences).
107. PRINCIPLES LAw AGG. LIT. § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (distinguishing between
"representative actions" like class actions and "administrative aggregations" like MDLs).
108. See BOLCH JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, DUKE UNIVERSITY, GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES
IMPLEMENTING 2018 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23 CLASS ACTION 32 (August 2018),
bttps://judicialstudies.duke.edulwp-content/uploads/2018/09/Class-Actions-Best-Practices-Final-
Version.pdf.
109. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 74, 76
(2015) (discussing and criticizing current procedures for dealing with lead attorneys in MDLs).
110. Id. at 87 (relying upon empirical data); see also Charles Silver, Civil Procedure and the Legal
Profession: The Responsibilities ofLead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) ("Lead attorneys enjoy plenary and, in many respects, exclusive control of the
litigation.").
111. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
112. Pretrial Order No. 4: Plaintiffs' Leadership Structure, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 2741 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) at 2.
113. Pretrial Order No. 12: Common Benefit Fund Order, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 2741 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) at 1.
114. Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. 185, 198 (2018).
115. Id. (suggesting this approach of "bifurcation or polyfurcation").
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using bifurcation within bellwether trials that does not differ in a material
way from the bifurcation procedures commonly used in class actions.1 16
II. THE COMMONALITY OF CAUSATION
The "reverse bifurcation" order in the Roundup MDL does not proceed
along the tried and true path of dividing between an initial "liability" phase
and a subsequent "damages" phase.1 17 Instead, in its bifurcation order the
Roundup MDL court proposed that three of the bellwether actions proceed
with an initial phase focusing solely on the issue of causation; specifically,
the initial phase addressed whether the glyphosate in Roundup can, and
actually did, cause the bellwether plaintiffs to contract Non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma ("NHL"). 118
The "reverse bifurcation" order is unusual because, as its name suggests,
it is the "reverse" of how bifurcation typically proceeds.119 Bifurcation
procedures in most cases begins with an initial phase to determine common
issues of liability, followed by a second phase to determine damages.12 0 The
Roundup MDL court has opted instead to begin with the impact of the toxic
exposure on specific plaintiffs-in this case, the three bellwether plaintiffs-
and then, if causation is proven, in the second phase look backwards to the
defendant's underlying conduct to determine whether the defendant is liable
for any injury it caused.121
Interestingly enough, in opposition to the proposed reverse bifurcation
procedure, the Roundup plaintiffs argued that reverse bifurcation was
typically employed "after years of litigation and/or settlements."122 For
example, the plaintiffs pointed out that the reverse bifurcation used in one
subset of asbestos litigation was utilized because "liability was largely
resolved by numerous prior trials." 23 In other words, the plaintiffs argued
that "reverse bifurcation" was typically used in situations where a first phase




119. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 11:3 (noting that "a common use of bifurcation ... is to try
liability issues to a jury before damages; in reverse bifurcation, damages are tried before liability."); see
also John P. III Rowley & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 2 n.4
(2010) (quoting 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2387 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010)).
120. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 11:3; Rowley & Moore, supra note 152, at 2 n. 4.
121. Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 8.
122. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, supra note 12, at 3.
123. Id. (citing STC UNM v. Intel Corp., No. 10-cv-1077 RB/WDS, 2011 WL 7562686, at *2
(D.N.M. Dec. 22, 2011)).
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was unnecessary given that liability had been established by previous
litigation.1 24
A. Specific Causation
The "reverse bifurcation" order is all the more unusual given that courts
have typically viewed the causation element, like the damage element, as a
noncommon element of the claim,125 and with good reason. Whether the
defendant's conduct caused an injury will turn, ultimately, on unique factors
of the plaintiff, such as their amount of use and exposure, the frequency of
the exposure, and their personal and family history with respect to NHL. 1 26
It is worth pointing out that the specific facts used to determine the extent of
any damage to a large extent overlap with the facts used to determine whether
the defendant's conduct caused any damage.12 7 This should make intuitive
sense; the amount of damage could be, for example, zero, meaning that no
damage was, in fact, caused.
In Tyson Foods v. Bouphakeo,128 for example, employees of a meat
processing plant brought claims for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, alleging that the employer failed to pay them for the time spent
"donning and doffing" protective equipment. 129 Because the employer failed
to keep records of this "donning and doffing" time, the district court permitted
the employees to use representative evidence to prove the amount of time for
each plaintiff.1 3 0 However, to recover for unpaid overtime, the employees
also had to prove that the failure to include "donning and doffing" times
caused them to work overtime in the first place, as some plaintiffs may have
worked less than 40 hours in a week even with the "donning and doffing"
time added."'
This raised a causation conundrum for the Tyson district court, as whether
donning and doffing times resulted in overtime for an individual employee
depended on the total time that employee worked, a point emphasized by
124. Stevenson, supra note 15, at 248.
125. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that causation, and in particular specific causation, "is [a] highly individualistic [issue that] depends upon
the characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g., state of health, lifestyle) and the nature of their exposure").
126. Pretrial Order No. 85, supra note 76, at 5.
127. Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 8.
128. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
129. Id. at 1040.
130. Id. at 1048-49.
131. Id. at 1052 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("[lt is not enough that a plaintiff was uncompensated
for compensable donning and doffing time; unless that plaintiff also worked more than 40 hours in a week
(including compensable donning and doffing time), he is owed no overtime pay and therefore suffered no
injury.").
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Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence.'32 But the Tyson case shows more
generally that the amount of a plaintiff's damages is intertwined with whether
the plaintiff suffered damages at all. 33 Whether an employee was owed
overtime (the causation issue) and the amount of overtime each employee
worked (the damage issue) are both wrapped up in the total amount of time
each plaintiff worked in a week.134
The individual nature of the causation element is also apparent when one
considers that for any specific plaintiff, an alternative cause may have been
responsible for his or her injury. 35 The Roundup MDL Court noted, for
example, that Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma can be caused by a number of other
causes, such as the presence or absence of a hepatitis C infection, as an "active
hepatitis C is a known risk factor for NHL."' 3 6 Accordingly, whether the
glyphosate in Roundup caused NHL for any specific plaintiff will depend,
among other things, on whether that specific plaintiff also had an active
hepatitis C infection around the time the plaintiff contracted NHL.
A further example can be found in Marcus v. BMW ofNorth America,13 8
in which the Third Circuit reviewed a class action involving breach of
warranty claims alleging that BMW vehicles with Bridgestone RFT tires had
a defect that caused flat tires. 139 The Third Circuit vacated the certification
order, concluding that the district court incorrectly assumed that causation
could be proven on a classwide basis.40 The Third Circuit noted, in
particular, that:
Causation is pivotal to each of Marcus's claims. Here the
District Court should have addressed an undisputed,
fundamental point: any tire can "go flat" for myriad reasons.
Even "defective" tires can go flat for reasons completely
unrelated to their defects. Critically, to determine why a
particular class member's Bridgestone RFT has "gone flat
and been replaced" requires an individual examination of
that class member's tire. These individual inquiries are
132. Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Given this difficulty [in identifying noninjured class
members], it remains to be seen whether the jury verdict can stand.").
133. Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1041.
134. Id. at 1049.
135. Pretrial Order No. 85, supra note 76, at 6-7.
136. Id. at 6, n.4.
137. Id. at 6, n.4.
138. 687 F.3d 583 (3rd Cir. 2012).
139. Id. at 588.
140. Id. at 612.
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incompatible with Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement.14 1
Because the presence or absence of alternative causes may differ from
plaintiff to plaintiff, the causation element will necessarily turn on facts and
circumstances that are specific to each plaintiff. 14 2
B. General Causation
As to the "specific causation" inquiry discussed above, the plaintiffs in
the Roundup MDL relied upon experts who applied a "differential diagnosis"
method of determining causation in which the expert "'rules in' all potential
causes of a disease, 'rules out' those 'for which there is no plausible evidence
of causation and then determines the most likely cause among those that
cannot be excluded."'l43 But in order to apply such a "differential diagnosis,"
the plaintiffs experts had to have evidence that the glyphosate contained in
Roundup can, in fact, cause NHL at the plaintiffs' levels of exposure.14 4 That
inquiry, which courts have called the "general causation" issue, requires a
different analysis altogether. 145
In the Roundup MDL the court defined the "general causation" issue as
whether "a reasonable jury could conclude that glyphosate, a commonly used
herbicide, can cause Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma ("NHL") at exposure levels
people realistically could have experienced."l46  The issue of "general
causation" typically arises in cases like the Roundup MDL where, as a
scientific matter, it is unclear whether a substance, chemical, or other aspect
of defendant's conduct has the capacity to cause the harm alleged by the
plaintiffs.14 7 Because it is difficult to directly observe how exposure to a
chemical like glyphosate can cause white blood cells, or lymphocytes, to
metastasize into NHL in any individual person, experts in toxic tort cases like
the Roundup MDL rely upon epidemiological studies to infer causation.14 8
In general, epidemiological studies seek to infer an association between
a treatment (like exposure to the glyphosate in Roundup) and an outcome
141. Id at 604 (citations omitted & emphasis added).
142. Id at 601.
143. Pretrial Order No. 85, supra note 76, at 1-2 (quoting Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858
F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2017)).
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id.
146. Pretrial Order No. 45: Summary Judgment and Daubert Motions, In re Roundup Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) at 1 (emphasis added).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 13.; see also Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) ("We
agree with the district court that epidemiology is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort
case.").
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(NHL) by using, among other things, "case-control studies."l49 In such
studies, an epidemiologist observes the incidence of the outcome among a
population exposed to the treatment, and compares it to the incidence of the
outcome among a substantially similar population who was not exposed to
the treatment.150 In this study an epidemiologist creates an "odds ratio [which
measures] the odds that a case (one with the disease) was exposed to the odds
that a control (one without the disease) was exposed.""'5  For example, if the
odds ratio is above 1, then this suggests that there is an association between
the disease and the treatment.15 2
These odds ratios, moreover, are "typically reported with confidence
intervals that seek to capture the likely effects of random error." 3
Confidence intervals measure the probability that an observed odds ratio was
due to chance, and although there is no required confidence interval necessary
to determine whether a ratio is "statistically significant," epidemiologists
typically prefer to infer causation only when the confidence interval is at a
.05 level or below.15 4
It is important not to get caught up in the scientific or statistical
nomenclature of epidemiology. In essence, the "general causation" inquiry
is a comparative inquiry that compares (1) the effect of a treatment on a
population to, ideally, (2) the state of the same population without the
treatment.1 55  This is actually a fairly common method of determining
whether any treatment was a "but-for" cause of an injury.1 56
Consider, for example, antitrust litigation, where the claim essentially
revolves around whether the defendant's allegedly anticompetitive conduct
raised prices as compared to a world where the defendant did not engage in
the conduct, which is what courts have called the counterfactual, "but for"
world.'57 Accordingly, in antitrust litigation both plaintiffs and defendants
typically use experts to not only measure the prices in the "actual world," but
149. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 14.
150. Id. An epidemiologist can also create a "cohort" study whereby a population is selected, a
subset of the population is exposed, and the epidemiologist observes over time the incidence of the disease
between the exposed and unexposed groups. Id. For now, I will focus on "case-control" studies for
purposes of clarity.
151. Id. at 15 (quoting Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 551, 568 (3d. ed. 2011)).
152. Id. An odds ratio of exactly I suggests that the treatment has no effect, one way or the other,
on the incidence of the disease. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 15. An odds ratio of less than
one may suggest that he treatment actually prevents, rather than causes, the disease. Id. at 66.
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 12.
156. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 5.
157. See, e.g., Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 58, 69 (D. Mass.
2009) (finding predominance satisfied since plaintiffs showed that the "'entire negotiating range' . . . was
higher than the prices in the but-for world").
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to construct models of the "but for" world without the conduct to prove or
disprove "the fact of antitrust impact.",5 1
Experts employed in securities fraud cases similarly use "event studies"
to determine the price impact (the "loss causation") of a fraudulent
statement.159 The event studies, in essence, compare the actual price of the
security after a fraudulent statement is made with the price of the security in
a modeled market without the fraudulent statement.'60 The "modeled market"
is usually developed by determining what the "expected return" for the
security would have been in the absence of the statement.16 1
Even in employment discrimination cases a similar method of comparing
a population with the treatment to a counterfactual world without the
treatment is necessary to prove causation.162  In such cases statistical
techniques are used to compare a treatment, the alleged discriminatory impact
of an employer policy or practice, with the counterfactual world where the
policy or practice was not used by the employer.'63
In contrast to the specific causation inquiry, the general causation inquiry
does not depend on the unique circumstances of the individual plaintiffs, at
least not on a specific plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis.' Instead, a counterfactual
world is modeled or constructed in which the defendant's conduct did not
occur. More importantly, like the facts that determine the liability element,
the facts used to construct the counterfactual world are common to the class.
In the Roundup MDL, for example, the "general causation" inquiry required
a construction of both an "actual" world and a counterfactual world based
upon the average exposure levels of the plaintiffs.16 5  As noted by the
Roundup MDL court:
158. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008)
(providing no proof of the "fact of antitrust impact" that "the entire negotiating range" was greater in the
actual world as compared to the but-for world).
159. Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits ofEvent
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96TEx. L. REv. 553, 555 (2018).
160. See id at 570 ("In its simplest form, an event study compares a stock's return on a day when
news of interest hits the market to the range of returns typically observed for that stock, taking account of
what would have been expected given general changes in the overall market on that day.").
161. Id. at 571 ("The third step is to determine the security's expected return on the event date, given
market conditions that might be expected to affect the firm's price even in the absence of the news at
issue.").
162. See Jason R. Bent, Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying Theory of Systematic Disparate
Treatment Law, 91 DENV. U. L. REv. 807, 824-25 (2014) (discussing statistical methods and noting that
"judges and juries . . . actually would like to know ... how likely it is that the observed disparities in
employment outcomes were caused by the defendant's unlawful discrimination?").
163. See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Cases, 122 HARV. L. REv. 533, 556
(2008) (noting that central counterfactual issue in employment discrimination cases is whether decision
would have been different if gender or race was different).
164. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 9.
165. Id at 54.
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[T]he inquiry at the general causation phase is not whether
glyphosate gave NHL to any of the particular plaintiffs who
brought these lawsuits, and the plaintiffs need not establish
any particular level of exposure. It's enough in this litigation,
at this stage, for the plaintiff to show that glyphosate can
cause NHL when people are exposed to the highest dose
people might plausibly experience.'66
Because the actual world and the counterfactual "but-for" world is the same
for all plaintiffs, the "general causation" issue likewise is an issue common
for all plaintiffs in the Roundup MDL.167 Indeed, as its name denotes, the
"general causation" inquiry is generally recognized as a common issue.'6 8
C. The Commonality of Specific Causation?
The commonality of general causation, as shown in mass tort cases like
in the Roundup MDL as well as similar general causation inquiries in
antitrust, securities fraud, and employment discrimination litigation, suggests
that at least part of the causation issue is common to the plaintiffs in the
litigation.169
Figure 4 - General and Specific Causation
General Specific
Causation Causation
7r, Actual World v.
Liability irl But-For World
Element x "Representative" Actual





ox verus n-1 Actual World v.not x
7r.. But-For World
But-For
not x b "Representative" World an Actual World 
v.
Tr .:n irn But-For World
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id.
168. See 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.24 (2d ed. 1985) ("stating that general
causation 'usually constitutes a common question because it can normally be determined without regard
to claims of specific individuals."').
169. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 9.
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Figure 4 shows a division of labor between the common general causation
inquiry and the individualistic specific causation inquiry, both of which are
necessary to establish the causation element of the claim. The general
causation inquiry establishes a common average case-the average or typical
"Actual World" (the top half of the "versus") as compared to the average or
typical "But-For World" (the bottom half of the "versus"). This average case
then assists with the evaluation of "specific causation" for each plaintiff,
where a court must look at the more particularistic "actual worlds" and "but-
for worlds" for each particular plaintiff.'o
Arguably, the general causation inquiry is unnecessary. This is because
the causation element concerns whether the defendant's choice of conduct
caused a specific plaintiffs injury.'7 1 However, two features of specific
causation make it dependent on the information developed in the general
causation inquiry.17 2  First, the reported facts of the actual world for an
individual plaintiff may not be available or they may be difficult to ascertain,
and thus the individual plaintiff may have to borrow information from other
plaintiffs, even non-plaintiffs, to determine causation. 173 For example, in the
Roundup MDL the experts noted that plaintiffs may have, among other
things, "recall bias" as to the amount of Roundup they used over time.174 This
obviously would make it difficult for a plaintiff to recover if her memory is
hazy, and she failed to keep all the receipts of her prior purchases of
Roundup.175 Recall bias also makes it difficult to infer whether Roundup can,
in fact, cause the disease in the first place, as the imprecision of the plaintiffs
memory may skew any inference one can make concerning a causal
connection between the glyphosate in the Roundup and Non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma.1 76
170. See Pretrial Order No. 85, supra note 76, at 3 ("[T]he important point is that these [specific
causation] experts will not be repeating the analysis of the general causation experts, but rather relying on
them to rule in glyphosate."); see also Greiner, supra note 163, at 560 (noting the importance of developing
average cases and counterfactual information for each plaintiff to determine causation in employment
discrimination cases).
171. David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 52-53
(2008).
172. Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action Litigation,
165 U. PA. L. REv. 1807, 1814 (2017).
173. See id. at 1815 (noting that in "vast areas of law ... courts regularly allow one person to use
evidence about another person as to events that are in some respects different from those involving the
first person. Gajillions of examples are possible").
174. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 16 ("One type of information bias, recall bias, occurs
where people with a disease (the "cases" in a case-control study) are differently able to recall past
exposures than are people who never get sick.").
175. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAuL L. REv. 305, 316 (2010) (noting that in the context of a class action
for consumers of pineapples, "[n]o one keeps the receipt for a pineapple, and any notice program is
unlikely to reach more than a handful of consumers").
176. See Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 16.
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In such situations, the use of information from other plaintiffs, or even
non-plaintiffs, can help to identify the ranges of exposure in which we have
some confidence that Roundup can cause a disease like NHL, and apply those
ranges to the facts of the plaintiffs case.177 In fact, in the Roundup MDL
itself, the general causation experts relied upon previously conducted case-
control studies that did not involve the actual plaintiffs at all."' Another
example can be found in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, where the failure
of the defendant employer to keep track of "donning and doffing" times
required the use of "representative" times from a subset of employees that
each specific plaintiff could borrow to determine their own donning and
doffing times and, thus, the overtime each was owed.17 9
Second, and more importantly, even if the "actual world" of the plaintiffs
is observable and free from bias, the "but-for," or counterfactual, world of the
plaintiffs is impossible to observe directly.8so This point will hopefully strike
many of you as intuitive. If you have ever reflected on a decision you have
made in the past, and thought about what would have had happened had you
chosen differently, then you have experienced the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of knowing "counterfactually" what might have been.
Even though the counterfactual world is impossible to observe, one can
infer the counterfactual world by observing the outcomes of, for example,
"controls" who are similar to the plaintiffs but who were not exposed to the
treatment.18 1 In fact, this is the approach generally taken by courts:
Suppose F is the claim that Drug caused Patient to suffer a
heart attack. Direct evidence as to F would require a way of
observing whether Patient would have had the heart attack
had Patient not ingested Drug. Such evidence is obviously
impossible to obtain, since we cannot observe the state of the
world in which Patient did not ingest Drug. Courts often
allow plaintiffs to introduce experimental and
epidemiological evidence concerning the effects of products
177. Id. at 12.
178. Id. at 17 ("One key publication is a pooled analysis of three separate case-control studies
conducted by the National Cancer Institute in the Midwestern United States between 1979 and 1986.").
179. Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 ("In many cases, a representative sample is 'the only
practicable means to collect and present relevant data' establishing a defendant's liability") (quoting
MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.493 (4th ed. 2004)). It is worth noting that Jonah Gelbach refers
to this type of evidence as "counterfactual" evidence given its inferential nature. See Gelbach, supra note
172, at 1815. Here I limit the definition of"counterfactual" evidence to evidence of the state of the world
in the absence of the defendant's conduct. In contrast, the representative evidence in Tyson is being used
to approximate the actual time spent donning and doffing for each plaintiff.
180. See Gelbach, supra note 172, at 1816 (noting that "a determined skeptic could insist on the
unanswerability of counterfactual questions, [but] many problems in social science, history, and other
fields require answering them").
181. Id. at 1817.
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on other persons to establish what has become known as
general causation. But the evidence as to general causation
is relevant only if Patient is assumed to be similar enough to
the populations of persons whose reactions to Drug have
been systematically studied. 182
Accordingly, the epidemiological evidence necessary to prove general
causation is also a necessary component in determining specific causation, as
the general causation inquiry produces the counterfactual evidence (and in
some cases, circumstantial evidence of the actual world) necessary to
evaluate whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs injury.183
Because the specific causation inquiry is tied to the common information
produced during the general causation inquiry, the specific causation inquiry
can approach the commonality of the general causation inquiry. 184  For
example, the average model of causation produced during the general
causation inquiry may be common to the class insofar as the model is not
sensitive to differences among the plaintiffs."' A clear example of this is the
"fraud-on-the-market presumption" in securities fraud litigation, where the
plaintiff s reliance on the fraudulent statement (what is known as "transaction
causation") is presumed if the security was sold on an efficient market.18 6 The
Supreme Court has stated that
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of
a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business. . . .
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements.18 7
According to the Court, one can assume that, in an efficient market, any
fraudulent statement necessarily caused transactions that affected the price of
the security, thus harming a plaintiff who purchased the security at that price
even if they did not "directly" rely upon the misstatement to make the
182. Id. (emphasis added) (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE TO
EPIDEMIOLOGY, IN REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE 549,551-52 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. & Nat'1
Research Council eds., 3d ed. 2011)).
183. Gelbach, supra note 172, at 1817.
184. I made this point in an earlier article, but expand upon it here. See Sergio J. Campos, Proof of
Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 751, 757 (2012).
185. Id.
186. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 247 (discussing the presumption); see also Halliburton, 573 U.S. at 283-
84 (upholding the use of the "fraud-on-the-market" presumption in securities fraud cases).
187. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42 (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
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purchase.18 8 The "fraud-on-the-market" presumption, moreover, establishes
the commonality of specific causation by in effect shifting the burden of
disproving specific causation to defendants by giving them an opportunity to
rebut the presumption of reliance in an individual case.189
The insensitivity of general causation evidence to differences among the
plaintiffs can be achieved accidentally, resulting in general causation
evidence that, in effect, becomes common specific causation evidence for
each plaintiff.1 90 Consider, for example, the Roundup MDL litigation
itself.' 9' In order to prove the causation of his or her failure-to-warn-claim,
each Roundup plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
glyphosate was a "substantial factor" in their contracting of NHL. 92 In
proving general causation, the Roundup plaintiffs presented experts that
relied upon epidemiological studies that showed odds-ratios that were
generally lower than 2, meaning that many of the studies showed that there
was a less than 50% chance that glyphosate caused NHL at the typical
exposure levels of the plaintiffs.' 93 Despite the "rather weak" evidence of a
"causal link between glyphosate exposure and NHL," the Roundup MDL
court found, for the most part, that the testimony of the plaintiffs' general
causation expert was admissible.'94
The Roundup MDL court, moreover, admitted the testimony of the
plaintiffs specific causation experts. 19 The court did so despite
acknowledging that there is no "biomarker or genetic signature associated
with" NHL caused by glyphosate, as opposed to NHL caused by another risk
factor, making it difficult for the experts to opine that glyphosate was the
specific cause of each plaintiffs NHL.1 96 In fact, given the difficulty of
excluding other causes, the plaintiffs' specific causation experts ultimately
relied heavily on the work of the general causation experts.'97 Nevertheless,
the Roundup MDL court noted, in particular, that "the Ninth Circuit's recent
decisions reflect a view that district courts should typically admit specific
188. Id. at 247 (noting that the typical "investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price"-the belief that it reflects all public, material
information.").
189. Halliburton, 573 U.S. at 269.
190. Campos, supra note 184, at 757.
191. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 957.
192. See Defendant's Memorandum Regarding the "Substantial Factor" Test and "But For"
Causation, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) at 1.
193. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 17; see also In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358
F.Supp.3d at 961 n.5 ("A doubling of the risk is significant under California law because it shows a 50%
chance that a specific factor was the cause of an individual's disease.").
194. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 2-3.
195. Id. at 67-68.
196. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 959.
197. Id.
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causation opinions that lean strongly toward the 'art' side of the spectrum."'98
The court further cited case law stating that "[t]he first several victims of a
new toxic tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply
because of the medical literature."199
In admitting the testimony of the plaintiffs' general and specific causation
experts, the Roundup MDL court, in effect, permitted the plaintiffs to prove
specific causation by using evidence of general causation.2 00 This is made
clear by the Roundup MDL court's denial of the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on general and specific causation, where the court
concluded that summary judgment should be denied because the plaintiffs
"present at least one admissible expert opinion to support their specific
causation argument."201 In denying the motions for summary judgment, the
Roundup MDL court concluded that the jury should resolve the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence concerning causation.202
Given the absence of biomarkers and the overall difficulty in excluding
other causes, the specific causation experts relied heavily, almost exclusively,
upon the testimony of the general causation experts to show specific
causation as to each plaintiff.20 3 Accordingly, the Roundup MDL court, in
admitting the testimony of the general causation experts, also allowed the
general causation experts to essentially prove specific causation for each
plaintiff, making the general causation evidence de facto common for each
plaintiff.20 4 This has played out in the trials, as the bellwether plaintiffs have
all won their trials.205
The Roundup MDL court, to its credit, acknowledged that the defendant's
attacks on the weakness of the general causation evidence really concerned
not the admissibility of the evidence but the "sufficiency of the evidence."206
In particular, the defendant's pointed out that the risk ratios of the studies
relied upon by the general causation experts tended to be less than 2.0 for the
exposure levels of the plaintiffs, which suggests that there was a less than
50% probability that glyphosate is the cause of NHL at the exposure levels
of the plaintiffs.207  Nevertheless, the court noted that "[w]hile a study
showing a risk factor greater than 2.0 might itself be enough to submit a case
198. Id
199. Id (quoting Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2017)).
200. Id. at 957.
201. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 957.
202. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 68.
203. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 959.
204. Id. at 958; see also Noah Smith-Drelich, Performative Causation, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (criticizing such use of general causation).
205. See Pretrial Order No. 145: Judgment, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741 (N.D.
Cal. May. 3, 2019) at 1 (noting that jury found in favor of Edward Hardemann).
206. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 961 n.5.
207. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 37, n.30.
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to a jury (assuming the study is scientifically sound), there is no bright-line
rule in California law requiring such evidence for a case involving medical
causation to survive summary judgment."208
D. The Necessity of Specific Causation?
I want to conclude briefly by discussing whether precise proof of specific
causation is strictly necessary. As an initial matter, proof of specific
causation is arguably unavoidable insofar as some proof of actual injury is a
necessary condition for a plaintiff to recover, simply as a matter of Article III
standing.2" There are, in fact, some exotic exceptions to the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III that may allow uninjured plaintiffs to recover,
exceptions I have explored at length in my prior writings.2 10 For now I want
to set aside these important considerations, and focus instead on the necessity
of specific causation given the underlying functions to the litigation.
I want to return to Figure 2, which showed that the basic elements of the
claim-liability, causation, and amages-proceed chronologically.
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As I mentioned earlier, the liability element concerns the choice the
defendant has made with respect to its conduct.21 1 Moreover, I noted that the
choice concerns mass production conduct, insofar as the choice made will
affect a large population of individuals which will include the eventual
plaintiffs in the litigation.2 12
Given the timing of that choice, which is ex ante, or before the actual
effects of that choice occur, the defendant cannot know specifically how its
208. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F.Supp.3d at 961 n.5.
209. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
210. See Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA L. REV. 553, 587 (2014).
211. See supra Part L.A.
212. See supra Part I.B.
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
choice is going to affect the population.2 1 3 That will only become known in
the future, and, even then, it will not be completely knowable given that once
the choice is made, we can never really know for certain the consequences of
the counterfactual choice to do something else.214
Nevertheless, when the defendant makes this ex ante choice, the
defendant, if it is rational, will at least seek to predict or forecast the effects
of that choice.215 Going back to Figure 2 above, if the defendant is rational
about the choice it will make between "x" and "not x," then it will take into
consideration the potential liability associated with each choice. Imagine, for
example, Monsanto's choice to add glyphosate to Roundup before Roundup
was introduced in the market.2 16 At that time Monsanto, if it was rational,
had to consider the potential liability that may arise not only from adding
glyphosate to its products, but also failing to warn about the effects of that
liability. 217
In fact, given the facts in the Roundup litigation, we actually do have
evidence that Monsanto cared about its liability with respect to the glyphosate
in Roundup.218 This is because the plaintiffs, in opposing the Roundup MDL
court's "reverse bifurcation" order, introduced evidence that Monsanto
"attempt[ed] to influence regulatory agencies and manipulate public opinion
regarding glyphosate," all in an attempt to avoid any regulatory
consequences, including the payment of liability for using the herbicide in its
Roundup products.2 19
Accordingly, although Monsanto cannot know with certainty the effects
of its decision to include glyphosate in its Roundup products, it does need to
forecast the likely effects of that decision in order to make a rational choice
about including glyphosate.220
213. Campos, supra note 184, at 796.
214. Id. at 798.
215. Id at 796.
216. Pretrial Order No. 45, supra note 146, at 4.
217. Pretrial Order No. 45, Id.
218. Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 18.
219. Pretrial Order No. 61, Id.
220. Id.
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Figure 5 - Ex Ante Choice




Figure 5 shows the ex ante choice made by the defendant, with "x"
representing conduct that would subject the defendant to liability, and "not
x" representing conduct that would allow the defendant to avoid liability. I
want to note a few things about this choice. First, because the choice impacts
an entire population (here denoted as "ni .. . rn"), the defendant's choice will
depend on the aggregate effect of the choice on the population (here denoted
as the aggregate damages "Li . . . L."). In fact, even if the defendant wanted
to know how its conduct would affect specific future plaintiffs, that would be
close to impossible.22 ' Second, even if its conduct would result in a certain
aggregate loss, that loss can be mitigated by what happens in the litigation
(here denoted as "7E . . . 7o v. A"). Thus, the choices that a court makes, or
that the defendant anticipates the court making, can result in the defendant
incurring all, some, or none of their actual liability. 222
It is worth noting that the goal of liability rules under tort law, antitrust
law, securities fraud law, employment discrimination law, and, in fact, any
subject area of the law, is not only to compensate for actual injuries incurred,
but to enforce compliance with the law.223 Moreover, in order to optimally
enforce the law, liability rules and litigation would ideally require the
defendant to incur the total loss of its unlawful conduct.22 4 Otherwise, if the
defendant can engage in unlawful conduct without having to compensate
victims, then it has no incentive to avoid engaging in that conduct.225
221. Campos, supra note 184, at 796.
222. Campos, supra note 45, at 1066.
223. Id. at 1117-18.
224. Campos, supra note 184, at 799-800.
225. Id. at 800.
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As a result, if the litigation can be structured so that a court can impose
the aggregate liability of the defendant's unlawful mass production conduct,
then courts can properly deter defendants from engaging in such unlawful
mass production conduct.22 6 This point is well known, and in class actions
courts have structured litigation to create aggregate awards that are later
distributed to the plaintiffs.2 27 In fact, in class action settlements the parties
effectively determine the expected liability of the defendant in the aggregate
and typically bifurcate the distribution of any settlement fund.228
In MDLs like the Roundup MDL, it is difficult for the MDL court to
create an aggregate liability award.229 Nevertheless, the MDL court can
structure the litigation in order to help the parties more accurately determine
the defendant's aggregate liability.2 30 One suggested method is for courts to
take great care in the selection of bellwether trials, so that a representative
sample of cases can be chosen to help the parties more accurately assess
settlement values for the other plaintiffs.2 31
Another option would be for the court to use a bellwether trial to develop
general causation evidence that can be used to help develop categories of
plaintiffs.23 2 This evidence, when combined with a sense of the total plaintiff
class, can help to ensure that, in the trials to follow, that the plaintiffs are
ultimately awarded the amount that would approximate the aggregate liability
of the defendant.23 3
One controversial thought would be to use class actions within the MDL,
assess a total liability award, and then relax the specific causation and damage
evidentiary requirements so that plaintiffs receive some award at low cost.2 34
Indeed, one could relax the specific causation requirements completely and
simply choose a simple, rational way to distribute the funds.235 One way
would be to allow for all Roundup purchasers to receive a rebate for the
increased risk of NHL each purchaser incurred from being exposed to
226. Id.
227. Campos, Id. at 786.
228. Lahav, supra note 114, at 197-98.
229. Id. at 197.
230. Id. at 186.
231. Id. at 198.
232. Id. at 199-200.
233. Id. at 200.
234. Id. at 199-200.
235. Id.
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Roundup.23 6 Although such increased risk claims have been rejected, they
may serve as a rational method of distributing the fund.237
Perhaps even more controversially, one could simply assess the total
aggregate award against the defendant and then escheat the award to the
government, either by supplementing disability insurance or by reducing
taxes.238 This could do away with the specific causation requirement entirely
while optimizing the law enforcement function of the litigation.239
CONCLUSION
In this lecture I have used the Roundup MDL "reverse bifurcation" order
as a springboard for thinking about causation in cases involving unlawful
mass production conduct. My goal was not to criticize or to praise the
bifurcation order, but to shed a little light on the underlying issues that the
Roundup MDL court, and in fact all courts, struggle with when they address
litigation involving complex causation issues. If anything, I want to end the
lecture my expressing my utmost respect and admiration for judges like the
Roundup MDL district court judge who struggle with these issues in real time,
and do their very best to bring justice to the parties before them.
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